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Abstract
Multiple-Choice Reading Comprehension
(MCRC) requires the model to read the
passage and question, and select the correct
answer among the given options. Recent
state-of-the-art models have achieved im-
pressive performance on multiple MCRC
datasets. However, such performance may not
reflect the model’s true ability of language
understanding and reasoning. In this work,
we adopt two approaches to investigate what
BERT learns from MCRC datasets: 1) an
un-readable data attack, in which we add
keywords to confuse BERT, leading to a
significant performance drop; and 2) an
un-answerable data training, in which we
train BERT on partial or shuffled input. Under
un-answerable data training, BERT achieves
unexpectedly high performance. Based on
our experiments on the 5 key MCRC datasets
— RACE, MCTest, MCScript, MCScript2.0,
DREAM — we observe that 1) fine-tuned
BERT mainly learns how keywords lead
to correct prediction, instead of learning
semantic understanding and reasoning; and
2) BERT does not need correct syntactic
information to solve the task; 3) there exists
artifacts in these datasets such that they can be
solved even without the full context.
1 Introduction
The pre-trained language models, such as
ELMo (Peters et al., 2018), GPT (Radford et al.,
2018), BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), XLNet (Yang
et al., 2019), RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019b), AL-
BERT (Lan et al., 2019) have drawn much atten-
tion recently as they have achieved the state-of-
the-art on a wide spectrum of NLP tasks. So far
the Tranformer (Vaswani et al., 2017) based model,
BERT, is the most widely adopted baseline on dif-
ferent tasks, such as Machine Reading Comprehen-
sion, Text Entailment, Sentiment Analysis, Rela-
tion Extraction, Dependency Parsing, and many
others (Devlin et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2019; Liu
et al., 2019a). How it achieves its performance is
of paramount importance in guiding NLP research
to rectify its model weakness and further leverage
its advantages.
Due to the high complexity of deep neural net-
work, it is still hard to explain how it works by di-
rect analysis of its parameters. Most analysis works
treat it as a black-box and use external probes to
assess the robustness and weakness of the mod-
els. We follow this black-box paradigm and design
new probing tasks to explore what attributes to
the high performance of BERT. In this work, we
focus on the task of Multiple-Choice Reading Com-
prehension (MCRC), which requires the model to
select the correct answer among several candidate
options, given a passage and question. Our prob-
ing approach is to attack the fine-tuned BERT by
adding distracting information with keywords dur-
ing testing. If the performance under attack signif-
icantly drops, we can infer that BERT relies too
heavily on keyword matching.
For this approach, which we term the Un-
Readable Data Attack, we explore three adversar-
ial attack methods by adding additional distracting
information into either the passage or the original
distractors to test the model’s robustness. The goal
of our adversarial attack is to manipulate the input
to mislead the model into making incorrect predic-
tions, while humans will still be able to choose the
correct answers under these attacks. Our distracting
information is mainly in the form of un-readable
(i.e. uninterpretable) sentences which are created
by shuffling the word order in the original input,
as shown in the example in Figure 1. Based on
our experiment results, we find that BERT is easily
distracted by the un-readable information, which
suggests that it heavily relies on the statistical pat-
terns such as keyword matching to achieve high
performance.
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Source: MCScript
Passage: Early this morning, I woke up to the sound of my
newspaper landing on my driveway. I sat up and wrapped
my pink robe around me. I slipped my feet into my slippers
and looked at the clock. It was only 7:00 but it was time for
me to get my newspaper and drink some coffee. I looked
out the window and noticed it was raining quite a bit ......
(Appended Adversary Sentence:) time in they 00 the wake
What am morning up : 9?
Question: What time they wake up in the morning?
Options:
A (Distractor). 9:00 am
B (Answer). seven o’clock
Figure 1: An example of Multi-Choice Reading Com-
prehension task (MCRC). The last sentence of the pas-
sage in bold is the un-readable sequence we append to
attack BERT.
While the MCRC task has been gaining intense
interest among the research community, it remains
unclear as of what information is necessary for
the model to achieve high performance on these
datasets. To investigate this problem, we fine-tune
BERT on the questions where humans can only
randomly guess the answer, but where keywords
remain in the training set.
For this direction, which we call Un-
Answerable Data Training, we first try partial
training where we remove the passage, the
question, or both, when training the model. Next,
we train BERT with shuffled input, where we
randomly shuffle all the words in the passage, or
question, or both. Under both settings, humans
would not be able to learn anything from the
training input. However, we observe that the
performance of BERT trained under these two
settings is much better than a random guess
baseline for all the 5 MCRC test sets. This
suggests that BERT does not need correct syntactic
information to answer the questions and there
exist artifacts and statistical cues within all these
datasets so that BERT can perform well even
without enough context.
We summarise our main contributions in this
work:
• We are the first to conduct a deep analysis of
the SOTA model, BERT, on MCRC datasets.
• We propose 3 methods to construct un-
readable data to attack BERT on MCRC
datasets and these methods will make the per-
formance significantly drop.
• We find that using un-answerable data to train
BERT on MCRC can still achieve good per-
formance.
• Based on all the experiment results from
two different aspects, we observe that BERT
mainly learns the key statistical patterns for
selecting the answer instead of semantic un-
derstanding; BERT can solve the task without
the correct word order; and current benchmark
datasets do not truly test the model’s ability
of language understanding.
2 Related Work
The interpretability and analysis of models for NLP
tasks usually fall into three directions: adversarial
attacks to reveal the weaknesses of NLP models,
partial data training to assess the quality of datasets,
and downstream tasks to test the linguistic proper-
ties of the model.
Adversarial attacks in NLP have attracted in-
creased interest in recent years and have been ex-
plored on several related tasks. Jia and Liang
(2017) show that by appending a distractor sentence
generated by manually defined rules, the state-of-
the-art performance on the SQuAD dataset drops
significantly. Ribeiro et al. (2018) systematically
generate semantic equivalent adversaries by para-
phrasing the questions. Ebrahimi et al. (2018) gen-
erate adversaries by replacing characters or words
in the input sequence based on the gradient of the
one-hot input vectors. Alzantot et al. (2018) de-
velop a black-box attack algorithm that exploits
population-based gradient-free optimization via ge-
netic algorithms. Iyyer et al. (2018) propose syn-
tactically controlled paraphrase networks and use
them to generate adversarial examples that follow
the target syntactic form. Wallace et al. (2019) use
a gradient-guided search to find universal adver-
sarial sequences that trigger a model to produce a
specific prediction when concatenated to any input
from a dataset. Sankar et al. (2019) observe that
neural dialog architectures models are insensitive
to most sequence perturbations.
Partial data training has also been adopted
to test the model and the datasets, such as ma-
chine comprehension and natural language infer-
ence tasks. Kaushik and Lipton (2018) find that
question- and passage-only models perform surpris-
ingly well on extractive machine comprehension
datasets, which suggests that some datasets may
not be challenging enough. Poliak et al. (2018) and
Gururangan et al. (2018) find that a hypothesis-only
model is able to significantly outperform a majority
class baseline across a number of NLI datasets and
they attribute this to statistical irregularities and
annotation artifacts of the datasets. Niven and Kao
(2019) probe BERT training by removing either
the warrants, claims or reasons from the Argument
Reasoning Comprehension Task and observe only
a small decrease of performance compared to the
full training setting, thus revealing that BERT relies
heavily on spurious statistical cues.
Analysis by downstream tasks is also a recent
line of work to analyze the linguistic properties of
NLP models. Goldberg (2019) find that BERT per-
forms very well on subject-verb agreement tasks,
showing its sensitivity to syntax. By probing the at-
tention heads of BERT, Clark et al. (2019) find that
certain attention heads correspond well to linguistic
notions of syntax and coreference, and that substan-
tial syntactic information is captured in BERTs
attention. Liu et al. (2019a) use seventeen di-
verse probing tasks and observe that linear models
trained on top of frozen contextual representations
are competitive with state-of-the-art task-specific
models in many cases, but fail on tasks requiring
fine-grained linguistic knowledge. Tenney et al.
(2019) find that BERT represents the steps of the
traditional NLP pipeline in an interpretable and lo-
calizable way. Warstadt et al. (2019) test BERT on
negative polarity item (NPI) licensing in English,
and find that BERT has significant knowledge of
these grammatical features.
In this work, we mainly focus on the first two
directions. We propose three new types of adver-
sarial attack methods based on shuffling, which is
simple and effective to test the robustness of the
model. Moreover, we extend the partial data train-
ing method to shuffled training. Instead of remov-
ing the whole passage or question, our proposed
method is to shuffle them to make the sequences
uninterpretable while keeping all the keywords. It
serves to analyse what kind information is required
to solve MCRC datasets.
3 Un-Readable Data Attack
In this section, we introduce the methods of con-
structing un-readable data to attack BERT. We
first fine-tune BERT on the original MCRC data
and then test it under adversarial attacks. The un-
readable data is mainly obtained by randomly shuf-
fling the word order of the input to make it gram-
matically wrong and un-readable. Note that we do
not shuffle the correct answers but only shuffle the
constructed distractors, and hence after adding the
un-readable distractors to the original MCRC test
data, the labels will remain the same. We propose
three methods of using un-readable data to attack
BERT and investigate what BERT actually learns.
An overview of our attack methods are shown in
Figure 2 and we will explain each one of them in
detail in this section.
3.1 Un-Readable Sub-Passage
AddSent2Pas-Shuffle One way of adversarial
attack is to add the un-readable data to the pas-
sage. An example is shown in Figure 1. Inspired
by the “AddSent” method (Jia and Liang, 2017),
we append an un-readable sequence to the end of
the passage to distract BERT. The sequence con-
sists of the question and all the original distractors.
Note that directly appending the raw sequence to
the passage, we may make some incorrect options
correct. To avoid such confusion, we randomly
shuffle the sequence to make it un-readable with
the following restriction on ShuffleDegree:
ShuffleDegree =
MinimumEditDistance
SequenceLength
The Minimum Edit Distance (MED) is com-
puted between the original sequence and the
shuffled sequence. We set a threshold for the
ShuffleDegree ∈ [0, 1] and reshuffle the se-
quence until the ShuffleDegree is higher than the
threshold. 1 We also reshuffle the sequence if there
is any exact match between the incorrect options
and a subsequence of the shuffled sequence. This
ensures that only meaningless information is added
to the passage and the answer of the question does
not change. The main difference triggered by our
method is that some keywords from the incorrect
options are now present in the passage. Ideally,
if BERT can fully understand the text, it will not
be fooled by the appended un-readable sequence.
If it is fooled, we could conclude that BERT re-
lies heavily on some statistical patterns, like the
passage-option keywords matching, from the train-
ing data.
3.2 Un-Readable Options
Another way of attacking BERT is to add the un-
readable data to the original distractors of the ques-
1Empirically we find that for all of our attack methods, the
average ShuffleDegree on all the datasets is above 0.65, which
is sufficient to make the sequence ungrammatical and hard to
interpret.
Figure 2: The procedures of constructing un-readable data to attack BERT.
tions to form the new distratcors and use these
constructed new distractors to replace the original
distractors. We propose two methods to construct
such attack.
AddSent2Opt-Shuffle In this method, for each
original distratcor of the question, we randomly
select one sentence from the passage and append
it to the original distractor. After appending, the
new distractors remain wrong, as the wrong facts
from the original distratcors are not removed. To
make the new distratcor un-readable, we further
shuffle these new distrators. The threshold of for
the ShuffleDegree restriction is also imposed for
shuffling. Note that, the correct answer is not mod-
ified and we only make the other incorrect options
un-readable. In this way, it should be very easy
for humans to select the correct answer since the
distractors are now uninterpretable and easy to be
distinguished between the correct answer. If BERT
gets much worse performance on these new op-
tions, it means that BERT relies too much on the
keywords matching, as the new distractors share
more matched words with the passage now, even
though the shuffling disrupts their original semantic
and syntactic information.
To further explore the attacking method, we
also compare it with another two variants,
AddSent2Opt, which only appends one randomly
selected sentence from the passage to the original
distractor without further shuffling, and Sent2Opt-
Shuffle, which directly shuffles the randomly se-
lected sentence from passage to replace the original
distractor. An example is shown in Figure 3.
AddAns2Opt-Shuffle In this method, instead of
appending one sentence selected from the passage,
we directly append the correct answer to the end of
each original distractor to form the new distractor
options. The new distractor options should still be
considered wrong since part of them come from
the original incorrect options. We further shuffle
these new options to make them un-readable.
Similarly, we experiment with two other attack
methods for comparison: AddAns2Opt: We ap-
pend the correct answer to the end of each original
distractor to form the new distractors, without shuf-
fling. Ans2Opt-Shuffle: We directly shuffle the
correct answer to replace the original distractors.
4 Un-Answerable Data Training
For all the methods in the previous section, we
are attacking BERT which has been trained on the
original MCRC dataset. In this section, we will
train BERT with un-answerable data, from which
human beings can learn little knowledge about the
ways to answer questions. We test whether under
this setting, BERT could still achieve higher perfor-
mance than random guess. Note that the test set is
not modified and still follows the original setting.
We will introduce two methods for constructing
un-answerable data.
Source: RACE-H
Passage: Mike is a factory worker. (Randomly Selected
Sentence:) He is often very tired after a day’s work. His
wife, Jenny, has no job, so she stays at home to cook the
meals...
Question: Jenny stays at home because .
Original Options:
A. she likes cooking
B. she loves her husband very much
C [Answer]. she doesn’t have a job
D. she doesn’t want to work
AddSent2Opt Options:
A. she likes cooking He is often very tired after a day’s work.
B. she loves her husband very much He is often very tired
after a day’s work.
C [Answer]. she doesn’t have a job
D. she doesn’t want to work He is often very tired after a
day’s work.
Sent2Opt-Shuffle Options:
A. ’s work . is very He after a tired often day
B. is tired often . day a ’s work after He very
C [Answer]. she doesn’t have a job
D. is very ’s often after work tired a day He .
AddSent2Opt-Shuffle Options:
A. He . a often she work tired likes cooking is ’s very day
after
B. ’s very day very tired work her is often . much He loves
husband after a she
C [Answer]. she doesn’t have a job
D. work . often He want work to ’s very tired n’t does after
a day she is
Figure 3: Examples of AddSent2Opt, Sent2Opt-
Shuffle and AddSent2Opt-Shuffle. The sentence in
bold from the passage is randomly selected to be added
to the incorrect options.
4.1 Shuffled Data
To make the questions un-answerable, one simple
way is to shuffle the word order the original text,
so that the shuffled texts do not follow the correct
grammar and become un-readable. Supposedly the
passage is the necessary information to answer the
questions in reading comprehension tasks, the ques-
tions will be un-answerable by randomly shuffling
the passage words. Although the shuffled passage
doesn’t follow the grammar any more, all the orig-
inal keywords are kept. If BERT can still achieve
high performance on shuffled data, we can con-
clude that BERT does not need the correct syntactic
information to answer the questions.
Based on this motivation, we try three different
settings of shuffled training data: 1) shuffle words
in the passage (P-Shuffle), as shown in Figure 4.
2) shuffle words in the question (Q-Shuffle), and
3) shuffle both the passage and the question (PQ-
Shuffle).
Source: DREAM
Shuffled Passage:
making not class . definitely If stick any dancing worth time
: am it effort W with considering I were and . I my you am
progress : . It’s I M dropping , I .
Question: What does the man suggest the woman do?
Options:
A. Consult her dancing teacher.
B. Take a more interesting class.
C [Answer]. Continue her dancing class.
Figure 4: Example of un-answerable data to train
BERT. The passage is shuffled.
Train/Dev/Test Pas/Que/Ans
MC160 280/120/240 204/8/3
MC500 1200/200/600 212/8/3
RACE-M 25421/1436/1436 231/9/4
RACE-H 62445/3451/3498 353/10/6
MCScript 9731/1411/2797 196/8/4
MCScript2.0 14191/2020/3610 164/8/3
DREAM 6116/2040/2041 86/9/5
Table 1: Dataset Statistics.
4.2 Partial Data
In another way, instead of shuffling either the pas-
sage or the question to construct the un-answerable
data to train BERT, we directly remove all the pas-
sages or the questions in training data. With partial
information left, human beings are also impossible
to learn how to select the correct answer.
Similar to the shuffled data setting, we also try
three different settings: 1) remove the passage (P-
Remove), 2) remove the question (Q-Remove),
and 3) remove both the passage and the question
(PQ-Remove).
5 Experiment
In this section, we introduce the datasets we use to
test BERT, our experiment results and our further
analysis.
5.1 Datasets
In this paper we analyse 5 MCRC datasets. We
briefly introduce each of them in this sub-section
and provide dataset statistics, including number
of questions split and average length of passage,
question and answer in Table 1.
MCTest (MC160 & MC500) (Richardson et al.,
2013) The passages in this dataset are open-domain
fictional stories written by crowdsource workers.
MCTest is divided into two sets: MC160 and
MC500. MC160 was gathered first, then improve-
ments were made before gathering MC500. Each
MC160 MC500 RACE-M RACE-H MCScript MCScript2.0 DREAM Average
Random Guess 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 33.3 -
BERT 74.7 69.3 75.6 64.7 87.7 83.9 62.8 -
AddSent2Pas-Shuffle 32.1 31.6 41.0 34.5 36.2 41.2 42.0 --57.0% -54.4% -45.8% -46.7% -58.7% -50.9% -33.1% -49.5%
AddSent2Opt-Shuffle 46.5 43.4 58.8 50.3 29.9 25.5 59.3 --37.8% -37.4% -22.2% -22.3% -65.9% -69.6% -5.6% -37.3%
AddAns2Opt-Shuffle 73.5 66.2 65.1 50.0 75.4 65.4 76.1 --1.6% -4.5% -13.9% -22.7% -14.0% -22.1% +21.1% -8.2%
Sent2Opt-Shuffle 37.1 36.7 48.3 43.3 14.5 15.4 30.6 --50.3% -47.0% -36.1% -33.1% -83.5% -81.6% -51.3% -54.7%
Ans2Opt-Shuffle 68.8 63.6 49.1 44.1 55.6 52.1 41.2 --7.9% -8.2% -35.1% -31.8% -36.6% -37.9% -34.4% -27.4%
AddSent2Opt 17.5 19.1 60.0 49.6 38.6 34.4 35.2 --76.6% -72.4% -20.6% -23.3% -56.0% -59.0% -43.9% -50.3%
AddAns2Opt 47.9 38.5 60.1 43.6 79.2 69.6 47.9 --35.9% -44.4% -20.5% -32.6% -9.7% -17.0% -23.7% -26.3%
Average Drop -38.2% -38.3% -27.7% -30.4% -46.3% -48.3% -24.4% -36.2%
Table 2: Results for un-readable data attacks. Numbers in italics are percentage change relative to the original
performance. The most effective attack method on each dataset is in bold.
MC160 MC500 RACE-M RACE-H MCScript MCScript2.0 DREAM
Random Guess 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 33.3
Longest Baseline 34.6 35.0 29.1 29.2 55.0 58.7 34.3
P-Shuffle 60.2 50.8 63.2 56.6 86.5 81.6 46.8
Q-Shuffle 70.8 62.9 72.7 62.5 86.7 83.6 50.5
PQ-Shuffle 60.8 49.2 60.6 55.0 83.3 77.0 41.2
P-Remove 38.7 38.7 48.1 51.5 76.8 73.6 41.9
Q-Remove 61.7 59.5 57.7 57.8 84.5 80.2 62.2
PQ-Remove 31.8 38.3 41.9 45.3 72.5 68.1 41.5
Table 3: Results for shuffled and partial data training.
question has four options and one of them is cor-
rect.
MCScript (Ostermann et al., 2018) This dataset
focuses on commonsense knowledge about se-
quences of events describing stereotypical human
activities, co-called scripts. Answering a substan-
tial subset of questions requires inference using
commonsense knowledge about everyday activi-
ties. Each question has two options and one of
them is correct.
MCScript2.0 (Ostermann et al., 2019) About half
of the questions require the use of commonsense
and script knowledge for finding the correct answer,
a notably higher number than in MCScript. In com-
parison to MCScript, commonsense-based ques-
tions in MCScript2.0 are harder to answer. Each
question has two options and one of them is cor-
rect. The test set has not been released yet so all
results in this paper are evaluated on its dev set. We
trained our model on the combined training set of
MCScript and MCScript2.0.
RACE (RACE-M & RACE-H) (Lai et al., 2017)
Unlike other datasets where the passages are crowd-
soured, the passages in this dataset are collected
from the English exams for middle and high school
Chinese students. The proportion of questions
that requires reasoning is larger in RACE than
other MCRC datasets. It is split into RACE-M
and RACE-H, which comes from middle and high
school exams respectively and RACE-H is more
difficult. Each question has four options and one
of them is correct.
DREAM (Sun et al., 2019) This is a dialogue-
based multiple-choice reading comprehension
dataset, collected from English-as-a-foreign-
language examinations designed by human experts
to evaluate the comprehension level of Chinese
learners of English, focusing on in-depth multi-turn
multi-party dialogue understanding. Each question
has three options and one of them is correct.
5.2 Experiment Results
Experiment setting All of our models are based
on BERTLARGE model, 2 which is a Transformer
with 24 layers, 16 heads and 340M parameters in
total. During training, the passage, question and
each option are concatenated as a new sequence to
run BERT. The segment embeddings for passage
words are set as 0, and the left words are 1.
Un-readable data attack experiment results are
shown in Table 2. The performance of BERT,
which is finetuned on the original MCRC dataset, is
shown on the top of the table. This finetuned BERT
is attacked by our different methods in Section 3,
and the results are shown in the middle of the table.
Note that our attacks do not change the questions
and the correct answers, and so the ground-truth
of the questions is also not changed. All the meth-
ods named with “Shuffle” will add un-readable
information to either the passage or the distratcors.
Based on the experiment results, we can clearly see
that the performance of BERT significantly drops
on almost all the datasets, and for some datasets
the performance is even lower than random guess.
It means that BERT is not able to detect the correct
word order or the grammar, and is heavily relying
on the keywords matching. For example, BERT
drops around 50% on average on all the datasets
under the attack of “AddSent2Pas-Shuffle”’. Al-
though the appended data is not readable for human,
it is able to fool BERT.
The methods named with “Add” will append ad-
ditional information to the original distractors. The
methods without “Add” directly use the shuffled ad-
ditional information as the new distractors to attack
BERT. By comparing the results of “AddSent2Opt-
Shuffle” and “Sent2Opt-Shuffle”, both of which
will make the distratcors un-readable, we can see
that the performance under “AddSent2Opt-Shuffle”
attack is generally better. In this way, we may
conclude that the words in the original distractors
also play an important role to make BERT get the
correct answer.
We also observe that different datasets suffer to
a different extent to the different attack methods.
For example, MC160 and MC500 are most sensi-
tive to the attack method “AddSent2Opt”, which
directly appends one sentence from passage to the
original distractors. As the datasets of MC160 and
2Our code follows the open-sourced work to fine-
tune MCRC model, https://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-
transformers
MC500 are relatively small, the exact matching
between the option and the passage still plays the
most important role for BERT to select the answer.
In the way, the attack can make the performance
even worse than random guess. RACE is most
sensitive to AddSent2Pas-Shuffle, while MCScript,
MCScript2.0 and DREAM are most sensitive to
Sent2Opt-Shuffle. These difference may be caused
by the different natures of the datasets, such as
the sources of the passages, questions and options;
and the different distributions of the questions (e.g.
proportion of matching, single-sentence reasoning,
multiple-sentence reasoning and arithmetic ques-
tions).
Un-answerable data training experiments are
shown in Table 3. From the experiments, we can
clearly see that BERT trained on all these settings
are much better than random guess and “Longest
Baseline” - which always selects the longest op-
tion as the prediction. For example, BERT trained
under the setting of “P-Shuffle”, which randomly
shuffles all the passage words in the training set,
even gets very close performance to the original
full training setting, especially on the MCScript
and MCScript2.0 datasets. If we further compare
“P-Shuffle” and “P-Remove”, we can find that al-
though the shuffled passage does not follow the
correct grammar and is not interpretable any more,
it is still better than removing the whole passage.
Similar performance can also be found by compar-
ing “Q-Shuffle” and “Q-Remove”, “PQ-Shuffle”
and “PQ-Remove”. In this way, BERT can still
learn from the shuffled input, which suggests that
it is insensitive to the word order or the syntactic
information.
The experiments in Table 3 not only reveal the
behaviour of BERT, but also reflect the general
problem of all the Multi-Choice Reading Com-
prehension datasets themselves. For example, ac-
cording to the performance of “Q-Remove” and
“P-Remove”, without even reading the question
or the passage, BERT can already achieve much
better performance than random guess, or some-
times even close to the full training setting (for
instance, BERT achieves 76.8% accuracy on MC-
Script and 73.6% accuracy on MCScript2.0 test
set when trained without the passages.) This sug-
gests that BERT may be exploiting dataset artifacts
and statistical cues to achieve high performance.
In this way, to test the true ability of neural mod-
els to comprehend the passages, questions, options
Figure 5: Plot of percentage performance change
against percentage length change of the options.
Correlation Coefficient: MCScript: -0.6403, RACE-M:
-0.3997.
Figure 6: Plot of percentage performance change
against percentage option length change, each point
refers to an attack method on a dataset. Correlation
Coefficient: -0.4293.
and perform reasoning, we need to be more careful
when constructing the datasets.
5.3 Further Analysis
In this section, we analyse whether shuffle-based
attack method is influenced by the answer length
and the randomness of the shuffled sequence, and
we will also have a case study to illustrate how the
un-readable data affect the predicted probabilities
of different options.
Effect of attacking sequence length change As
our attacking method “AddSent2Opt-Shuffle” ap-
pends additional information to the original incor-
rect option, we test whether the performance drop
is affected by the distractor length change (con-
structed new distractors compared to original dis-
tractors). We plot the percentage performance drop
against percentage length change of the distratcors
under “AddSent2Opt-Shuffle” on RACE-M and
MCSCript in Figure 5. It shows that these two
factors are not correlated, with relatively large neg-
ative correlation coefficient scores on both datasets.
Furthermore, for all the attacking results in Ta-
ble 2, we compute the average sequence length
change of each attacking method on each dataset
and plot all the points in Figure 6. We also get a
quite large negative correlation coefficient score.
It also shows that, in general, changing original
sequence length from the datasets is not the main
reason why the attacks can fool BERT.
Whether shorter answers are easier to attack
We plot the percentage performance changes
against the correct answer length, as shown in Fig-
ure 7. We do not observe strong correlation be-
tween the performance of our attaching method
and the answer length.
Figure 7: Plot of percentage performance change
against answer length under AddSent2Opt-Shuffle At-
tack. Correlation Coefficient: MCScript: 0.7693,
RACE-M: -0.4048.
Effect of random shuffling For our attacking
method “AddSent2Opt-Shuffle”, we randomly
shuffle the sequence as our attacking options. We
will analyse how the degree of shuffling affects the
performance. We plot the accuracy of BERT within
different ShuffleDegree ranges, which reflects the
difference between shuffled sequence and the origi-
nal sequence, in Figure 8. Note that the ShuffleDe-
gree in the plot represents the largest ShuffleDegree
of all the shuffled options of each question. We
can observe a weak tendency that with higher Shuf-
fleDegree the performance of BERT drops more.
Figure 8: Plot of percentage performance change
against ShuffleDegree under AddSent2Opt-Shuffle At-
tack. Correlation Coefficient: MCScript: -0.8965,
RACE-M: -0.3442.
Source: MCScript2.0
Passage: I saw a sign for large pizza for 5.99 at domino
pizza. I wanted to invite some people to my house. I made a
list of toppings that all like. (Randomly Selected Sentence:)
Then, I found a number to call. I told him carry out. Then
he asked me about the type of crust and I told him hand toast.
I ordered all large pizzas. 2 of them just plain cheese, 2 of
them with beef and chicken, 2 of them with jalapeno and
green pepper.
Question: When did they bring total $38.25?
Original Options:
A [Answer]. when pizza delivered
B. at the counter
New Distractor B after AddSent2Opt-Shuffle:
the . , Then I a number counter at found to call
Probability Change:
Probability Answer Distractor
Empty Distractor 0.893 0.107
+ the 0.880 0.120
+ . 0.822 0.178
+ , 0.808 0.192
+ Then 0.782 0.218
+ I 0.798 0.202
+ a 0.794 0.206
+ number 0.458 0.542
+ counter 0.583 0.417
+ at 0.496 0.504
+ found 0.265 0.735
+ to 0.216 0.784
+ call 0.099 0.901
Figure 9: Case Study of AddSent2Opt-Shuffle, we ini-
tialize the distractor as a empty sentence paddings and
add the token from the AddSent2Opt-Shuffle distractor
one by one to analyse the predicted probability change.
The correct answer remains unchanged in this process.
Case Study In Figure 9, we show a case study of
how the predicted probabilities of the correct an-
swer and distractor options change when each word
of the distracting sequence is added to the distractor
option. We can observe that: 1) Keyword match-
ing plays an important role, for example, adding
the word “number” to the distratcor option that
matches the number “38.25” in the question sig-
nificantly decreases the probability of the correct
answer. 2) Keywords from the original distractor
can also help the model identify the correct answer.
For example, adding the word “counter” from the
original distractor increases the probability for the
correct answer. 3) Adding more matched words
to the distratcor options can decrease the probabil-
ity for the correct answer. 4) Stopwords can also
influence the prediction.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we explore what BERT learns from
MCRC datasets through un-readable data attack
and un-answerable data training. We proposed 3
different methods to attack BERT, and find that
when un-readable distracting information is added
to either the passage or the original distractors,
BERT is highly likely to be fooled. In this way,
we show that BERT relies heavily on the keywords
to solve multi-choice reading comprehension tasks.
We also use randomly shuffled input and partial
input to train BERT, and observe that BERT could
still learn surprisingly well how to answer the ques-
tions correctly. This shows that BERT does not
need the original correct syntactic and semantic
information from the datasets to solve the task. In
particular, the high performance on partial training
shows that BERT can exploit the dataset artifacts
and statistical cues to perform well instead of learn-
ing natural language understading and reasoning.
To make the model better understand natural lan-
guage, both the datasets and the model need to be
further improved.
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